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Abstract
When container shipping lines experience over-capacity and high fuel costs, they
typically respond by decreasing sailing speeds and, consequently, increasing
transport time. Most of the literature on this phenomenon, often referred to as slow-
steaming, takes the perspective of the shipping lines addressing technical,
operational and financial effects, or a society perspective focusing on lower
emissions and energy use. Few studies investigate the effects on the demand side of
the market for container liner shipping. Hence, the aim of this study is to elaborate
on the logistics consequences of slow-steaming, particularly the strategies that
Swedish shippers purchasing deep sea container transport services employ to
mitigate the effects of slow-steaming. Workshops and semi-structured interviews
revealed that shippers felt they had little or no impact on sailing schedules and were
more or less subject to container shipping lines’ decisions. The effects of slow-
steaming were obviously most severe for firms with complex supply chains, where
intermediate products are sent back and forth between production stages on
different continents. The shippers developed a set of strategies to cope with the low
punctuality of containerised shipping, and these were categorised in the domains of
transfer-the-problem, transport, sourcing and distribution, logistics and
manufacturing, and product design. All firms applied changes in the transport
domain, although the lack of service segmentation limited the effects of the strategy.
Most measures were applied by two firms, whereas only one firm changed the
product design.
Keywords: Container liner shipping, Coping strategies, Slow-steaming, Shippers,
Inventory
Introduction
Shipping lines have reduced sailing speeds to mitigate the effects of over-capacity and,
until recently, high fuel costs since the financial crisis started in 2008. Slow-steaming is
a rather straightforward issue in the tank and bulk segments, where the shipowner
often negotiates terms directly with one or a few shippers. In liner shipping, however,
the shipping lines face a vast array of shippers with different preferences for speed and
costs; in addition, routes often include multiple port calls, and the ships are engaged in
tight and complex itineraries. As a result, timetables are often single-handedly chan-
ged, and shippers are merely notified or simply have to wait for shipments to arrive.
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Most of the literature on slow-steaming either takes the perspective of shipowners
addressing technical, operational or cost-minimisation issues—assuming that the effect
on shippers is fully captured by an increased cost of capital tied up in the transported
products—or that of society with implications of lower emissions by slow-steaming. In
reality, however, the effects on supply chains using container liner shipping is far more
complex; consequently, this study takes the perspective of the shippers. The purpose is
to briefly elaborate on the logistics consequences of slow-steaming, categorise principle
mitigation strategies, and investigate and categorise the strategies Swedish shippers pur-
chasing deep sea container transport services use to cope with the effects of slow-
steaming.
The study started with a workshop aimed at selecting case firms that engage two
large forwarders and a set of firms highly dependent on foreign trade. In all, six firms
in retailing, steel manufacturing, and industrial systems, equipment and tools were se-
lected for semi-structured interviews conducted by two researchers and a representa-
tive from a forwarder. A second workshop with the forwarders and case firms focused
on strategies for coping with the effects of slow-steaming in the deep sea container
segment.
The first part of the next section reviews literature on slow-steaming and its effects,
and the second part elaborates on plausible strategies for coping with the effects of lon-
ger lead times. The sections serves as literature review and conceptual framework for
the empirical part that follows. It contains a brief section on the Swedish firms’ slow-
steaming experiences and a more extensive analysis of the mitigation strategies they
employ. Finally, implications of the findings are discussed and conclusions drawn.
Slow-steaming and its effects on logistics
Slow-steaming is the most potent measure for reducing fuel consumption with existing
vessels, and it offers shipowners an attractive mix of reduced operational costs, lower
external effects and lower vessel capacity on the shipping market. However, the chal-
lenge is to keep fulfilling the shippers’ quantitative and qualitative needs for maritime
transport (Kalantari, 2012). This section focuses on the rationality behind the
phenomenon of slow-steaming and its effects.
The negative external effects of shipping and the subsequent need for a substantial
reduction of these externalities is increasingly accepted in the maritime community.
Energy efficiency, and thereby the reduction of emissions per unit of transport work,
can be achieved via a number of operational and technical improvements (Faber et al.,
2010; Kontovas & Psaraftis, 2011a; Notteboom, 2006; Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2013; Sher-
baz & Duan, 2012); slow-steaming is among the most effective and easiest to imple-
ment (Corbett et al., 2009; Cariou, 2011; Faber et al., 2012; Lindstad et al., 2011; Meyer
et al., 2012; Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2010; Tai & Lin, 2013), and it often comes with a
negative CO2 emission abatement cost. Due to the non-linear correlation between
speed and fuel consumption (i.e., the so-called admiralty formula, which estimates a
cube function, meaning a 10% speed reduction yields a 27% fuel consumption reduc-
tion), even a marginal speed reduction will result in a substantial fuel consumption re-
duction (Wang & Meng, 2012).
Slow-steaming, as a measure for reducing fuel consumption and emissions, is exten-
sively examined in the literature (see, e.g., Mason & Nair, 2013) and can be divided into
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two categories: (1) the study of the technical validity and quantification of the impact
of slow-steaming on ships’ fuel consumption and emissions, and (2) the economic viability
of this strategy from the shipowners’ perspectives, primarily through the study of speed
optimisation aimed at cost minimisation or profit maximisation. The first category thor-
oughly establishes the merits of slow-steaming. The second category, although it offers
important insights, approaches slow-steaming more as a supply side reaction to tie up
transport capacity, and thus affects the market price for shipping services rather than be-
ing an active measure for energy efficiency (Devanney, 2011). This becomes apparent, for
instance, when the same body of literature reaches the conclusion of speed increase when
market conditions are characterised by relatively low fuel costs, high freight rates
and scarce capacity (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2014), and speed reduction in markets
with relatively high fuel prices, low freight rates and over-capacity, as elaborated
on by Cariou (2011), Meyer et al. (2012), and Notteboom and Vernimmen (2009).
Although bunker cost savings is a major incentive for slow-steaming, the impact of
the fuel price level alone is not as salient as one might suspect because fuel surcharges,
or bunker adjustment factor (BAF), distort the economic signal that the fuel price pro-
vides to shipowners in regard to sailing speed (ibid). BAF is a contractual construct that
transfers the risk of fuel price fluctuations from the shipowner to the shipper. This
means that even when fuel prices are extremely high and bunker accounts for more
than 60% of the shipowners total cost (UNCTAD, 2008), the shipowners might opt to
retain high speeds as long as the underlying demand for the service is strong (Fransoo
& Lee, 2013; Wang et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, slower speeds result in fewer voyages per year, which essentially re-
duces the annual transport work produced by the vessel; hence, more ships are re-
quired to uphold the frequency of the service (Psaraftis & Kontovas, 2010). Maximising
the utilisation rate of capital intensive and scarce resources is obviously a priority, but
in parts of the shipping business cycle, vessel capacity is far from scarce and the option
is to lay up ships. Especially for liner shipping, changing the schedule for any reason
might create bottlenecks and introduce more variability in the global system, which
could create issues that are difficult to foresee (Harrison & Fichtinger, 2013).
Notwithstanding the positive environmental and economic effects of slow-steaming,
the practice also entails significant and potentially negative operational and economic
consequences for the shippers, i.e., the customers of the service that the shipping com-
panies produce—most notably, the increased lead time resulting from longer transport
times (Fredriksson & Jonsson, 2009; Maloni et al., 2013; McKinnon, 2012). Unilateral
changes in sailing speed contribute positively to the reduction of CO2 emissions, but
only temporarily if the supply chains using the service cannot cope with the lead times
and opt for more carbon intensive alternatives. Nevertheless, it is feasible that slow-
steaming will become the long-term norm due to environmental regulations (Kontovas
& Psaraftis, 2011b), demand pressure or the shipowners’ own environmental ambitions.
Over the past few years, the demand for environmentally sustainable transportation has
amplified and shippers are taking different measures to reduce their negative impact on
the natural environment. For instance, IKEA together with its transport providers is striv-
ing to minimize its adverse environmental impact, as nearly 80% of total CO2 emissions
of IKEA’s business operations are caused by its transportation activities (Lai et al., 2011).
Simultaneously, Nike and HP not only reduced emissions from their logistics operations
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but also saved millions of dollars in cost by shifting their shipments from air to sea trans-
port (Gerdes, 2012). Contrary to these initiatives that highlight the best practices pursued
by shippers, the empirical research demonstrates that environmental factor is com-
paratively given less importance by shippers when selecting a transport service.
Lammgård (2007) in this context based on a survey conducted in 2003 among Swedish
manufacturing and wholesale firms, exhibit that service price, total lead time, reliability,
and environmental efficiency of a transport service are respectively the key factors consid-
ered in transport service choice decisions. Lammgård and Andersson (2014) in a later sur-
vey conducted in 2012 with same target group found that despite the increasing societal
concerns about climate challenges, the environmental efficiency of a transport service is
consistently considered the least prioritized factor by the Swedish shippers. Moreover,
from the French shipper survey (ECHO) of 2004 that covers the properties of 3000 ship-
pers, 10,000 shipments and 20,000 transport chain legs, it could be observed that to deal
with demand fluctuations, to enhance production-process’ efficiency and not least to re-
duce warehousing costs, firms are increasingly applying the just in time (JIT) and lean
supply chain approaches in their business operations (Guilbault and Gouvernal 2010).
Thus, slow steaming as a green argument might not be convincing for shippers, as they
prefer shorter lead time and higher reliability over the environment. Additionally, trade-
offs—such as that between sailing speed and punctuality (Harrison & Fichtinger, 2013) or
sailing speed and shelf time, as well as a low rate of waste and obsolescence for perishable
goods like fresh food—might warrant fast shipping. Furthermore, slow-steaming increases
pipeline inventory and safety stock that is affected by transport time and punctuality.
Ronen (2011), however, found evidence that a reduced sailing speed actually increases the
punctuality or reliability of the service. This point is contended, in whole or in part, by
Harrison and Fichtinger (2013), Maloni et al. (2013), and Saldanha et al. (2009). Regard-
less of the impact of slow-steaming on service punctuality, there are few authors who have
empirically tried to evaluate how the shippers value the trade-off between speed and
punctuality.
Notteboom and Rodrigue (2008) contend that shipping lines design their systems
to offer a service that is convenient, whereas they are contracted to provide their
customers with a service they demand in terms of quality and price. This view,
combined with the reasoning above, leads one to conclude that the shipowners are
not receptive to any single outside signal to reduce their sailing speed; nor is the
shippers’ demand on transport time, punctuality, frequency or route a deciding fac-
tor for liner shipping companies decisions regarding fleet management. The seg-
mentation of the offered services on the supply side of the market is not sufficient,
as shippers are not savvy enough purchasers to make use of a differentiation that
exists (Saldanha et al., 2009).
Hence, when fuel prices are high and the market is characterised by over-
capacity and, thus, falling freight rates, shipowners implement slow-steaming. His-
torically, this has been the case any time slow-steaming has been broadly employed
in the shipping industry. The reviewed literature reveals a consensus concerning
the fact that the adoption of slow-steaming, regardless of how it is communicated
and marketed, is motivated by economic factors that arise from temporary market
conditions; therefore, the speed increases again once the market characteristics are
reversed.
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Shippers’ slow-steaming mitigation strategies
In manufacturing, most parts are procured from domestic suppliers while the stra-
tegic parts, which are characterised by a high value and being produced utilising
economies of scale, are purchased from other countries (Reeves et al., 2010). Com-
ponents and sub-assemblies, which also have a low price-to-weight or price-to-
volume ratio, are increasingly sourced over longer distances. South Korea, Mexico
and Eastern Europe—regular component suppliers to Japan, the USA, Canada and
Western Europe, respectively—increasingly face competition from Asia. To a lesser
extent, container shipping lines transport products from Europe and the USA to
East Asia. In a research review regarding the location aspect of global sourcing
strategies, von Haartman and Bengtsson (2015) indicate that most literature is de-
scriptive and predominantly addresses cost advantages and business interactions, a
phenomenon also identified by Schiele et al. (2011). Transaction costs (Williamson,
1979) and operational aspects including logistics often seem to be neglected. The
phenomenon has attracted substantial scientific attention since then.
According to Deardorff (2005), theories of international trade often assume that
transport is costless and instant, or it is simply treated as an add-on. For example,
when interviewing Swedish manufacturing firms, Lindau et al. (2004) identified an
attitude of treating transport services as “a given infinite commodity available at a
market price”. This approach is sufficient for selecting hauliers for short distance
transport, but much more effort must be spent on inter-continental transport with
a large and increasing share of the supply chain’s lead times, costs and environ-
mental impacts. Supply chain managers trained and used to solving lead time is-
sues by shortening the length of the chain and send small consignment with road
transport. Global supply chains minimising labour costs for each manufacturing
step involves true challenges by reintroducing long transport lead times; slow-
steaming amplifies these effects.
As mentioned previously, this article aims to identify, structure and analyse the
measures for dealing with the increased lead times by slow-steaming. The render-
ing focuses on components, sub-assemblies and finished products transported by
container shipping rather than raw materials transported by bulk shipping. In
addition, it focuses on practical and economic issues related to global trade and
does not particularly question the trade for environmental reasons, as is done by
Tavasszy et al. (2003). When analysing the effects of extended supplier distances,
Woxenius (2007) uses logical deduction to suggest a structure of approaches for
dealing with the prolonged lead times. The structure is organised along approaches
that the supply chain actors can choose from or combine, which are sorted accord-
ing to the degree of changes in their own operations and the time frame needed
for implementation. The set of approaches includes transferring the problem up-
or downstream, transport, logistics, supply chain structure, manufacturing concept
and product design. In the following sections, the structure is used to deal with
the increased lead time induced by slow-steaming, with most attention paid to the
measures that require the least adaptation from the manufacturing and retailing
firms. The structure is found sufficiently fit for the purpose of categorising slow-
steaming mitigation strategies because it also addresses longer lead times—but it
might not cover all possible actions.
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Coping by transferring the problem up- or downstream
The simplest, and often the immediate choice for strong actor along the supply chain—
and often the final assembler or retailer under its own brand—is to keep its own activ-
ities as is and require that upstream or downstream actors solve the problems for them,
that is, moving the problem along the supply chain rather than solving it. Obviously
this reduces the potential benefits. In a more conceptual language, it can be referred to
as a channel relationship using transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1979,
1981); because the framework will be used to structure discussions with practitioners,
the straightforward term transfer-the-problem is used. Taking all the key components
of transaction cost theory (i.e. transaction cost, contracting cost, coordination cost and
search cost) into account, the total transaction cost of finding solution to the increased
lead time caused by slow steaming within the firm itself may be greater than the trans-
action cost of transferring the problem up or down stream (Coase, 1937), which justi-
fies this phenomenon. From Williamson, (1981, 1979) it could be inferred that the
supply chain actor that possesses the stronger control over critical resources, in
principle, has preferential access to information, which in turn ensures the efficiency
and sustainability of its relationship with other supply chain partners. Furthermore,
Williamson (1981), illustrates the bilateral exchange relationship from the transaction-
cost-economizing perspective. The author explains that to meet the unexpected and
substantial increase in demand of its closed body cars, and to cut the transportation
and inventory costs, General Motors (GM) urged Fisher Body (the body supplier) to re-
locate its body manufacturing plants close to GM assembly plants. However, upon re-
sistance from Fisher Body, GM made transaction-specific investments and purchased
Fisher stock which later resulted into the merger of both firms and facilitated GM
operations.
Another example is Volvo Trucks, representating a truly global manufacturing com-
pany with brands as Mack, Renault Trucks and UD trucks with a powerful position in
the supply chain.. In an example from 2005, 215,000 trucks were manufactured to
order with a planning horizon of 19 calendar days. Deliveries of sequenced components
and sub-assemblies were very strictly scheduled. Second -tier suppliers were encour-
aged to produce components in any low-wage country but they had to carry the in-
creased cost of storage and the risk of obsolescence. Batch-delivered parts were often
produced and delivered from adjacent regions, but for suppliers with facilities further
awaywere forced to store the parts at a pick-up point within a certain time distance set
by Volvo.
Hence, Volvo merely moves the problem to its suppliers by defining where they must
locate production or distribution centres. Volvo also transfers the risk of obsolescence
to its suppliers by buying sequenced and small parts on an assembly plant use basis, i.e.
vendor-managed inventory whereas ownership of batch-delivered parts is transferred at
pick-up points (Alftrén, 2006).
Coping by changed transport system
Prolonged lead times by slow-steaming can also be addressed without changing the
shipper’s operations by replacing container shipping for faster transport. According to
Hummels (2001), faster transport services by air and sea reduced the tariffs on
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manufactured cargo from 32% in 1950 to 9% in 1998. Between continents, time is gen-
erally disproportional to the distance. For manufactured goods, air is sufficiently fast
and sea offers large and sufficiently cheap capacity but it is a true challenge to close the
supply gap between air and sea in terms of time, cost and capacity. The supply gap can
be closed by cutting costs and capacity constraints for air, but absent propulsion tech-
nology breakthroughs, together with comparatively high fuel costs and environmental
concerns, make it more realistic to improve the speed of sea transport byimproving the
port operations, calling fewer intermediate ports, finding new routes, implementing fas-
ter vessels and combining traffic modes.
With ever-larger container ships, handling times are considerable, although port op-
erations try to catchup Giving time-critical containers priority during port handling
might cut handling time by a day or two but a more likely development is to cut trans-
port time by a number of days when larger flows allow for routing vesselsdirectly be-
tween one port in each continent or increase their frequency. So far, however, shipping
lines have deployed larger vessels to meet the larger flows .
A potential option is traversing the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is about 6000
nautical miles—or 50%—shorter between Northwestern Europe and Northeast Asia
than the Suez Canal passage (Raza & Schøyen, 2014). NSR transit shipping is likely to
result in a higher capacity and may ultimately reduce risks of disruption and congestion
(Schøyen & Bråthen, 2011). Nevertheless, literature suggests that the NSR is presently
not economically feasible for liner shipping due to shallow waters, a short season and
unreliable Arctic ice conditions, extensive building costs for standardised ice-classed
vessels, poor infrastructre along the NSR, high and unpredictable NSR tariffs, and a
scanty fleet of icebreakers (Furuichi & Otsuka, 2014; Lasserre, 2014; Lee & Song, 2014;
Liu & Kronbak, 2010). In addition, the ice-classed ships are more costly, heavier and
would consume excessive fuel when used in southern routes during winter (Pierre and
Olivier 2015) 2015). Furthermore, the potential reduction in transport time is less sig-
nificant for China and South Asia, which accounts for a significant share of the current
container flows to Europe and a lack of intermediate ports of call along the route also
restricts the scope of the NSR.
Nuclear propulsion has been a hope but they have not proven to be of any commer-
cial success (Hass, 2014; Radiationworks, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a technical po-
tential because nuclear-powered aircraft carriers match the size of container giants at
100,000 tons and cruise at up to 35 knots, although at a prohibitive cost (Carlton et al.,
2011; DNV, 2014; Gu & Zhang, 2014). Currently, it is regarded as unrealistic to renew
plans for commercial nuclear vessels for both economic and public opinion reasons.
Neither significantly increasing speeds with current diesel engine designs nor fitting
ships with steam turbines, like the Sea Land Commerce that crossed the Pacific at 33
knots average speed in 1973 (Schoyen and Steger-Jensen, 2017), would be economically
justified. However, the potential for new propulsion technology for fast and economical
sea transport remains to be seen.
The combination of sea and air, e.g., through Dubai, is regarded as relatively mature,
but Mediterranean ports like Trieste and Gioia Tauro in Italy, and Barcelona in
Spain, offer a combination of sea and road or rail in order to cut a few days to Northwest
Europe, compared to doubling the Iberian Peninsula. Besides reducing lead time, such
transport chains avoid passage of the North European and Baltic Sea Sulphur Emission
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Control Area as well as additional costs from using cleaner fuel or emission reduction
technology. The inland transport system in China is still slow despite extensive invest-
ments in the domestic road and rail network, but when the current investment scheme is
finished and operational and administrative routines are improved, hinterland transport
times are likely to be reduced significantly. For total transport chains, this can partially
compensate for the longer times spent at sea due to slow-steaming.
The Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and coming rail alternatives within the Chinese
Belt & Road Initiative are often mentioned as a viable alternative or rather complement
to air and sea in regard to time and costs. The TSR is connected to rail tracks in Russia,
Belarus, Poland and further in Western Europe, as well as Chinese and Mongolian
tracks in Asia. The TSR offers a reduced lead time of nearly 10 days (34%) between
Europe and Asia; for instance, the transport time between Hamburg and Shanghai is
18–20 days compared to 28–30 days via the Suez Canal. The lead time advantage of rail
freight is enforced by the slow-steaming of vessels (Rodeman & Templar, 2014: Verny
& Grigentin, 2009). However, test runs in 2005 for Dynapac, a Swedish manufacturer
of construction equipment that imports containers with components from China, re-
sulted in just 2 days to 1 week of lead time reduction at a tripled transport cost com-
pared to sea transport (Wendel, 2005). To speed up transport time, various measures
are taken by, e.g., the EU, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and China; these measures in-
clude easing border crossings, compatibility in gauges, voltages and safety systems as
well as simplifying legal framework and new information and communication technolo-
gies (COMCEC, 2017).
For the TSR service operating between Moscow and Shanghai, the total volumes
measured in Twenty-foot Equvivalent Units (TEUs) reached 948,000 TEUs in 2008;
from this volume, 429,000 TEUs represent international container traffic (Tavasszy et
al., 2011.) Currently, the TSR accommodates approximately 5% of the total shipments
between Asia and Europe (Tsuji, 2013). DB Schenker operates weekly train services be-
tween Germany and China; 45,000 TEUs were transported by DB Schenker between
both countries using the TSR in 2014. Freight rates are up to 50% higher for TSR over
sea transport, but the TSR option between Germany and China is nearly twice as fast
as ocean shipment from terminal to terminal (DB Schenker, 2015).
Although the TSR may be competitive in terms of time and costs, there are doubts
regarding its capacity. According to the Government of Poland (2004), the capacity of
the TSR, after modernisation, is limited to 600,000 TEUs a year compared to the 21,7
million TEUs transited between Europe and Asia in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). Hence,
container ships will dominate the EU-Asia trade for many years to come, but the TSR
is at least an option for reducing the supply gap between sea and air. The TSR can also
be instrumental in developing areas along the TSR into sourcing regions for western
firms (COMCEC, 2017), with 36 intermodal terminals along the route (Dynkin, 2002).
At present, there are many uncertainties that impair the smooth movement of con-
tainer cargo between Europe and Asia using the TSR. Among the main issues are cul-
tural and political differences across the countries involved in the TSR, poor
cooperation among the railway companies, theft, corruption, and dissimilarities in rail-
way systems in terms of infrastructure, equipment and management. Thus, the use of
the TSR for container shipments between East Asia and Western Europe amplifies the
cost and lead time compared to other transport modes. Currently, container shipping
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through the Suez Canal is the least expensive option, and the NSR and TSR may appear
to be roughly equivalent second-tier alternatives (Cho, 2007; Rodrigue et al., 2013; Song
& Na, 2012; Tavasszy et al., 2011; Verny & Grigentin, 2009).
Coping by changed sourcing
The sourcing domain, similar to what (Meixell & Gargeya, 2005) denotes the supply
chain design domain regards which actors are part of the chain and, predominantly,
the localisation of the intermediate nodes; more definite locations of suppliers, such as
investigated by Eberhardt et al. (2004) and Woxenius (2012); and the localisation of its
own plants (Gammeltoft et al. 2010; Radlo 2016). One option is to balance demand
over the season and production life cycle by sourcing a specific product from different
locations. A manufacturing firm can then order products that matches the lowest fore-
casted sales volume from distant locations, complementing orders over the season or
product life cycle from closer places and emergency orders from suppliers in adjacent
countries. With short product life cycles, the first batches of components can be
sourced in the relative vicinity of the assembly plants and then sourced from longer
distances when the product matures in the market.
A similar distinction is plausible for manfucturing firms sourcing components and
sub-assemblies. Generic components are sourced in distant countries and semi-generic
products in nearby countries, and successively move the source closer to the assembly
facility because the components are more unique. A contradiction is that generic com-
ponents are often heavy or voluminous products with comparatively low labour con-
tent, with small benefits of sourcing in distant low-wage countries involving container
shipping.
These measures imply different levels of integration between buyer and seller. Tani-
necz (2004), for example, finds that firms with the least supplier integration and the
most customer integration are less likely to source from China and, thus, be a subject
of slow-steaming. He believes that the reason for the latter is just-in-time delivery com-
mitments, but another interpretation is that tight integration means the supplier de-
velops the components, and then the assembly firm simply cannot use another
supplier.
Coping by changed logistics and manufacturing concept
In the logistics and manufacturing domain, an obvious—but often painful—option is sur-
rendering from build to order (Gosling and Naim 2009; Gunasekaran and Ngai 2005; Li
and Womer 2012) and rather use prognoses and go back to stock-keeping finished prod-
ucts. In other words, they will make to stock (MTS) (Altendorfer and Minner 2014; Shi et
al. 2014) based on forecasts, rather than make to order (MTO) based on customer orders.
Buffering components at different stages and applying postponement, i.e., delaying the
moment when generic products become specific, might also be an approach for coping
with longer lead times caused by slow-steaming. One aspect of logistics involves purchas-
ing transport services, e.g., choosing traffic mode and how to use and combine them
based on standard offers as investigated by, for instance, Kiesmüller et al. (2005). Exam-
ples are using different traffic modes in different seasons or product life cycles, using air
transport for solving occasional problems, and adapting consignment sizes and departure
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frequencies to the transport offer. The current sourcing strategies generally take the sup-
ply gap between air and sea into account. Either low-cost, generic products are sent by
container shipping or expensive products are sent by air. As a consequence, products with
a medium price-weight or price-volume ratio are often not traded between continents.
Using the TSR or new offers as part of Belt & Road Initiative would rather facilitate new
trade than taking market shares from sea and air.
Coping by redesigning the product
In the long run, the product design domain will be further affected by the globalisation
of supply chains. The measures include over-delivering, i.e., building with “optional”
equipment in the standard model, like the Japanese car manufacturers when they first
challenged the manufacturers in Western Europe and the USA. Another way is to mod-
ularise the product to decrease the dependency on accurate prognoses (Doran, 2005;
Frigant & Lung, 2002), which the Swedish truck manufacturer Scania realised and mas-
tered. To really reap the benefits of global sourcing, manufacturers are likely to increase
the share of generic components, design the product for postponement, or at a mini-
mum decrease the value of unique parts that require local sourcing. Economies of scale
in manufacturing also fosters this development. As an example, Japanese producers of
electronic calculators used the same electronics in the interior of different calculators
in the 1980s—only differentiated by the available buttons on the calculator cover. Dril-
ling extra holes allowed for using all functions also after buying the cheapest model.
Another example is Volvo Car Corporation, which only differentiated the V70 models
with 140 and 170 hp. engines by settings in the engine control software, hence an ex-
ample of postponement. Another obvious and often commonly cited example is Bene-
tton’s dyeing of T-shirts following the sales of the colours in their stores. The
conceptual rendering is summarised in the conceptual model in Fig. 1.
Nevertheless, it is a significant simplification that the magnitude of change increases to
the right in the figure. For instance, a new product design might imply incremental
changes if done consciously between product generations, whereas changing suppliers
might imply severe strain on the work in the purchasing department and the punctuality
of deliveries will affect the assembly operations. Other measures might not feasible at all;
channel relationships are obviously not an option for firms with a weak position in the
supply chain, and even strongly positioned firms will pay a price in one way or another.
Empirical findings
Sweden is a small country that is heavily dependent on foreign trade. About 90% of the
total foreign trade volume is carried by maritime transport in some part of the trans-
port chain (Swedish Maritime Administration (2014). Large parts are transported by
dry bulk and tank shipping. Extensive trade with neighbouring countries is dominated
by RoRo shipping, but a significant part of the trans-ocean trade is effectuated by con-
tainer liner shipping. In 2014, the flow through the largest port, Port of Gothenburg,
was 837,000 TEUs (Port of Gothenburg, 2015), but feeder shipping via minor Swedish
ports as well as rail and road transport directly to and from continental ports accounts
for much larger flows. Swedish industry and commerce are therefore heavily dependent
on access to effective and efficient maritime transport services.
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Data collection methodology
The data collection started with a workshop aimed at selecting case firms among the
customers of DB Schenker and DHL, two of the largest active ocean freight forwarders
on the Swedish market. Both act globally and are among the largest worldwide. Firms
were invited based on their fit to the scope of the study, and larger companies were
favoured in the selection because they were assumed to have larger flows of goods and
sufficiently mature logistics operations that could deliberately handle the effects of
slow-steaming. The firms were represented by senior logistics managers. In all, six firms
from different trade-intensive sectors were selected for semi-structured interviews. The
selection was based on representation of production strategies MTS, forecasts and
MTO, customer orders, and a mix thereof as well as a representation of business-to-
business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) sales patterns. Furthermore, the selec-
tion was made based on having global supply chains and being available for interviews.
The interviews aimed to identify the firms’ experience from slow-steaming in deep sea
container shipping during the last years; the findings are elaborated on by Finnsgård et
al. (2015).
To investigate how firms experience the effects of slow-steaming, a literature re-
view and case selection workshops were used to develop an interview guide. The
guide for the semi-structured interviews (appended as Appendix) was developed by
two of the researchers and then reviewed and revised by the other researchers in-
volved in the project. The final version was also reviewed by representatives from
the forwarders involved in the project. During the entire process, access to mul-
tiple analysts and industry representatives was purposefully employed in order to
increase the validity of the results. All but one of the interviews were conducted
by two researchers, and a representative from the forwarders was present during
all interviews. The presence of the latter was regarded as useful because discus-
sions were more lively and detailed than regular researcher-respondent interviews.
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-lower frequency for full loads
-air as backup
-change traffic mode over the
season and product life cycle
-postponement
Fig. 1 Measures for coping with increased distances and lead times in component supply. Source:
Woxenius, 2006
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The researchers thus shifted between being active interviewers and observers dur-
ing the sessions.
The data collected during the interviews was transcribed, processed and sent back to
the informants for validation and, in four cases, revised. In all six cases, follow-up inter-
views were conducted over the telephone or via email. The verified data was stored in
a case study database (available on request). The results of the data collection and the
analysis were presented and discussed during a workshop attended by all case firms
and other project partners for further validation. The main aim of the second work-
shop, however, was to identify, discuss, and categorise the strategies and measures the
case companies have applied to cope with the effects of slow-steaming. Before the sec-
ond workshop, the respondents reviewed their replies and were exposed to the nomen-
clature in the shippers’ mitigation strategies, as presented in section 3. The results from
the case study database, in conjunction with the discussions at the second workshop,
resulted in the matrix presented in Table 2.
The case companies and their transport demand
The case companies can be divided based on production strategy, i.e., if they apply MTS
or MTO. MTS companies deliver their products to final consumers off the shelf from
warehouses or retail locations, meaning that the lead time gap is maximally expanded.
This entails that any changes to the lead time do not necessarily impact the customer lead
time. This is in contrast to MTO companies, for which any increase in transit lead time
proportionally impacts the customers’ lead time. Data are summarized in Table 1.
Company A is a global retailer with 147,000 employees that contributes to a turn-
over of 29 billion € in 2014. In Sweden, Company A has 19 retail locations, employs
roughly 13,000 workers, and sold for 1.46 billion € in 2014. Company A claims to pro-
vide sustainably produced and distributed, affordable products that are available in the
company’s own stores and under its own brand. The company sources its products glo-
bally, and 90% of the total volume moved by trans-ocean liner shipping includes fin-
ished products from manufacturing sites directly to stores or via distribution centres.
Table 1 Data for the case companies
C. Turnover,
M€














100% 500,000 Yes, partly FCA
B 290 61 1700 100% 500 (400) Yes DAP
C 750 75 1700 80–
100%
10,000 No CIF











130 47,500 (7000) 30% 70% 6000 Yes CPT
SE Sweden; Incoterms, CIF Cost Insurance and Freight, CPT Carriage Paid To, DAP Delivery at Place, EXW Ex Works, FCA
Free Carrier, FOB Free On Board
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Raw material and components are often locally sourced to the manufacturing facilities,
hence, the small share of container shipping in the first links of the supply chain. Prod-
ucts are ordered based on sales prognoses and MTS. Company A’s logistics organisa-
tion is not involved in sourcing decisions in the short term; therefore, it only fulfils the
transport demand induced by the purchasing organisation. In the medium term, 2–
3 years, the logistics organisation does influence decisions to strategically reconfigure
the sourcing patterns. Air freight is used in cases of unforeseen emergencies but almost
never as a part of the base case supply plan. Once product demands are forecasted and
ordered, the logistics organisation purchases A to B transport, as opposed to door-to-
door transport. Suppliers deliver according to Incoterm FCA (Free Carrier). As an ex-
ample, the assignment to deliver goods to port, haul the goods port-to-port, and the
final delivery from destination port and the store or warehouse could be purchased sep-
arately as well as from different service providers. Therefore, the control needed to op-
timise the distribution system rests in the hands of the logistics organisation. The
supply chain can be characterised as functional and strives to fill whole units in order
to boost efficiency. The company’s annual global maritime volumes are estimated at
500,000 TEUs, which are mainly composed of 40-ft high cube containers.
Company B is an industrial equipment manufacturer and distributor of industrial fil-
tration, recycling and cleaning equipment in workshop environments. The company
has sales and service presence in 31 countries, manufacturing and assembly plants in
11, and distributors in an additional 30 countries. The company has an annual turnover
of 290 M€ and employs some 1700 people. Almost two-thirds of the volume is
transported by truck and RoRo shipping to continental Europe, and the remaining
third is shipped out by containerised liner shipping. The flows included in the case
study are the outbound volumes of finished products and components from
Sweden to the Far East and North and South America. Air transport is used as a
competing mode to maritime transport but the products are voluminous, making
them expensive to send by air. For cost and environmental reasons, the aim is to
minimise the use of air freight. Both components and finished products are pro-
duced after Company B receives actual orders. The level of customisation for many
of the systems sold is such that orders normally originate from sales agents or off-
shore manufacturing sites, which in turn also place their orders based on actual
end-customer orders. Sales are delivered according to Incoterm DAP (Delivered at
Place). Transport services are routinely purchased as door-to-door transport from a
forwarder. The company has a standing order based on the departure schedule of
the shipping lines. Deviation from the standing order is managed through contacts
with a forwarder. The forwarder is biannually re-evaluated in competitive tender-
ing. The annual volumes for the relevant flows are about 500 TEUs.
Company C is a manufacturer of steel powder products. It turns over 750 M€ per
annum, employs around 1700 workers, and has sales and distribution representation in
75 countries. Most of the production is located in Sweden from Swedish iron ore, but
there are also production facilities in the USA and India. Company C recognizes that
its global competitive advantage is product quality and advanced research and develop-
ment. Flows included in the case study are outbound flows of components (i.e., general
steel powder) and finished products (i.e., customer-specific prepared mixes of steel
powders). The company purchases container liner shipping services directly, without
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the involvement of a forwarder, using Incoterm CIF (Cost Insurance and Freight) when
delivering to its customers. The company has a standing order based on the departure
schedule of the relevant shipping lines. Deviation from the standing order is managed
through contacts with the shipping line. Air freight is an option only during rare
occasions of emergency. Usually, different shipping lines are called on in order to
manage variation in demand and disturbances. Transport service suppliers are re-
evaluated annually using competitive tenders. The annual volume for the relevant
flows is about 10,000 TEUs.
Company D is a fashion retailer with 480 stores in Europe. The company identifies
its value proposition as delivering an affordable fashion experience that is more femin-
ine, inspiring, joyful and sustainable. Key product ranges are women’s wear, kids’ wear
and cosmetics. Company D also operates an online sales channel to customers in all
EU countries and Norway. The company has some 5000 employees worldwide and
turns over roughly 720 M€ annually. About 80% of the volume is managed through a
distribution centre in Sweden, and the inbound flow to this facility is what is consid-
ered in the case study. Aside from 3 to 4% of the total volume, which is shipped using
air freight, the inbound flows are shipped by containerised liner shipping, usually in the
East Asia to Europe trade. Supply is delivered according to Incoterms FOB (Free on
Board) and FCA (Free Carrier). The bulk of the orders are made based on sales fore-
casts, and additional orders are placed based on point of sales data. The transport
service is purchased from a forwarder who coordinates the transport door-to-door.
This means that ensuring access to capacity and matching demand with supply re-
garding the transport is part of the service purchased. The annual volume for the
relevant flows is about 2500 TEUs.
Company E is an industrial systems and equipment manufacturer with a diverse
product range, from industrial power systems and robotics to low voltage products
and automated process systems. Globally, the company is present in 100 countries,
has 300 manufacturing locations, 150,000 employees and a turnover of approxi-
mately 40 billion €. In Sweden, the company employs 9000 people in 30 different
locations. As such, the company has multifaceted supply chains with both complex
inbound and outbound flows for MTS and MTO. It is estimated that, based on
volume, MTS dominates, whereas measured in value, MTO is the dominating
strategy. Considering palletised goods, the ratio of inbound to outbound volume is
60/40. Local manufacturing sites predominantly serve local markets, which makes
the inbound flows of interest for this case study. However, the product range is so
diverse that any one characterisation of the flows is bound to be inaccurate in
some sense. The company controls and optimises its own flows by purchasing A
to B transports. Supply is delivered according to Incoterms EXW (Ex Works) and
FOB, and deliveries using DAP and CPT (Carriage Paid To). The logistics organisa-
tion does not influence the supply strategy and acts as an internal supplier of
transport, given the demand derived from the manufacturing and purchasing func-
tions. One of the objectives of the logistics organisation is to increase the level of
central control over the physical flows to and from the many sites at different geo-
graphical locations. The centralised control and coordination aims to increase the
efficiency of the physical flow of goods within the company’s supply and distribu-
tion networks.
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Company F is an industrial materials and tools manufacturer with expertise in
materials technology and a range of products, including industrial tooling equip-
ment for mining, machining solutions to advanced materials, and construction
equipment. The company is organised in five business divisions. Globally, the com-
pany employs 47,500 and has an annual turnover of 9.25 billion €. The company
identifies its strategic strength as a technology leader in the premium segment of
its sector—a segment characterised by high entry barriers. The division included in
this case study is the materials technology division, which employs around 7000
people in Sweden. It produces advanced steel materials for further manufacturing
by its customers and has an annual turnover of 1.5 billion €. The significant flows
in the case are movement back and forth between offshore production sites and
final distribution to customers. A common supply chain starts with products made
in Sweden, which are shipped to their own production sites in China, then back to
Sweden for final adaptation before being shipped out to the final customer. In the
case of a final customer in China, the products in various manufacturing stages are
shipped between continents several times, which obviously amplifies the impact of
transport lead time. Deviation in lead time can also impact the levelling of produc-
tion in production facilities in cases of MTO products. About 30% of the orders
can be delivered directly from stock, whereas 70% are MTO. The transport ser-
vices are purchased via a forwarder with regular allotments that are booked in ad-
vanced and modified if necessary. The Incoterm CPT (Carriage Paid To) is used.
The company aims to control the flow from origin to destination, meaning that
one way or another, the liner shipping leg of any transport always falls within the
purview of the company. The transport lead time is a significant portion of the
total lead time, which means that, especially for the MTO segment, its impact on
the customers’ lead time is substantial. The annual volumes for the relevant flows
are about 6000 TEUs.
Effects of slow-steaming as perceived by the shippers
The first phase of this exploratory case study aimed to understand how shippers are af-
fected by the widespread application of slow-steaming, which is analysed and presented
by Finnsgård et al. (2015). The reduction of sailing speed since 2008–2009 has resulted
in 20–50% longer transport times for the shippers in this study, depending on trade
and whether transport time is considered port-to-port or door-to-door, or for single
legs from A to B or for entire global supply chains. The price of the service has, as per-
ceived by the shippers, at best decreased marginally or stagnated/increased marginally
at worst. The trade-off between price and speed was uniformly considered unfavour-
able. Most of the studied companies were prepared to pay more for faster transits, with
one company finding the trade-off more complex than just price and speed. However,
even this company did not view the current trade-off as favourable. All the case com-
panies more or less confirmed that they did not experience any increase in punctual-
ity after the introduction of slow-steaming. Some of the companies could also
confirm, based on their experience as shippers, that the shipping lines offering the
highest service frequency also generally delivered a service with higher punctuality.
This is not so much due to lack of deviations, e.g., missed or cancelled departures,
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delays etc.; rather, the impact of any disturbance was minimised due to the higher fre-
quency of the service.
Companies applying MTS deliver their products to final consumers off the shelf from
retail locations, meaning that the lead time gap is maximally expanded. This entails that
any changes to the lead time do not necessarily impact the customer lead time. The lit-
erature review led to the hypothesis that the increase in lead time would lead to an in-
crease in inventory, most notably pipeline inventory but also safety stock, which would
increase inventory costs. Surprisingly, all but one company stated that any increase in
inventory cost was a secondary concern, as the revenue side of the business was the de-
ciding factor. For companies applying MTS, availability in store (avoiding loss of sales)
and obsolescence (price cuts due to overstocking) were deemed more of a concern than
increases in pipeline and safety stock costs. As for companies applying MTO, where
any increase in transit lead time proportionally impacted the end customers’ lead time,
the risk for loss of sales or decreased customer service due to excessive lead time was a
bigger issue. Only one company identified the increased inventory cost as a major issue.
This company’s production structure was such that a product, which is made to order,
would be shipped by liner shipping between facilities several times during a production
cycle, amplifying the impact of sailing speed on lead time and inventory cost several
fold. This was also the only company that prioritised a minimised transport time above
all else. They calculated a price tag for each container and day, meaning that it was
clear what they would be willing to pay to reduce the lead time. Otherwise, the division
was between MTS and MTO companies, where MTS companies valued punctuality
more and MTO companies put a higher value on speed. This is understandable be-
cause the customers of MTS companies are usually not directly affected by transit lead
time due to the expanded lead time gap; therefore, the companies valued the ability to
operate according to plan with minimal deviation more than making plans with shorter
cycle times. Conversely, for MTO companies, any additional day in transit meant an
additional day of lead time for their customers; hence, they found a higher value in the
ability to deliver in a timely fashion.
The environmental benefits by the increased energy efficiency are highlighted in the
slow-steaming literature. However, none of the companies in this study recognised
slow-steaming as an explicit measure for increased environmental performance. Al-
though no one disputed the reduction in fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emis-
sions resulting from slow-steaming, the individual companies saw vastly different
potentials in their customers’ willingness to bear the additional costs. MTS companies
that retail fashion and home furnishing products to consumers perceived a higher de-
mand for increased environmental performance. Conversely, the MTO companies that
had other industrial companies as customers noted that any cost associated with sur-
passing their customers explicitly stated requirements regarding environmental per-
formance was likely to be viewed unfavourably. Therefore, the distance to consumers
was decisive for the level of environmental concerns. Furthermore, they also pointed
out that there is a limit to how much the lead time to a customer can increase before
they starts looking for other, even qualitatively inferior, substitutes. This could lead to a
paradox where the increase in energy efficiency in shipping that comes at the cost of
prolonged transport time would lead to a modal shift to faster modes with dramatically
larger energy use.
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Shippers’ strategies for managing the consequences of slow-steaming
The case companies use a number of strategies for managing the longer transport times
following the reduction of sailing speed. These strategies and their application by the
case companies are elaborated on and divided into the principle lines of action as
follows:
Transfer-the-problem
Although all of the case companies could claim to employ this to some extent, only
two consciously employ transfer-the-problem as a strategy for managing the increasing
lead times. In the case of Company F, which regards outbound flows in an MTO set-
ting, the customers, or downstream actors, simply have to accept the lead time offered.
The liner shipping market does not offer enough segmentation in its service offering to
make this approach effective. Of course, changing modes of transport is an option, and
both companies also utilise the available tools in the transport domain, but the cost of
changing modes to, e.g., air freight, is prohibitively high.
For Company A, which operates in an MTS setting and mostly handles inbound
flows, the transference is made upstream to its suppliers. There are limitations regard-
ing this strategy, but the power dynamic and large complex network of suppliers still
make this approach a viable option in this case.
The transport domain
All case companies identify this strategy as their primary effort for managing the in-
creasing lead times. This is intuitively plausible, as this is the most immediate action
that can be taken—in an extreme case, by changing modes to a faster one. However, in
light of the spatial configuration of sources and sinks, the distances in question gener-
ally make air freight the only feasible substitute. This is beside the issue regarding cap-
acity; it is prohibitively expensive. This is evident in the fact that only marginal flows
are transported by air in all of the companies, and almost none of the volumes that are
flown were planned to do so originally, i.e., air freight is only used as a “firefighting”
measure.
However, in the current market, there are significant limits to what can be achieved
through this measure. All companies cite the lack of segmentation in the supply of
shipping services. It appears that once the sailing speeds drop on a specific trade, it
does so across the board and for all available services. This means that there aren’t very
many choices to be made by the transport buyers in terms of transport time. Most of
the companies re-evaluate their service contracts regularly via competitive tenders and
monitor the performances of their service providers continuously, but the differences
between the different providers are not large enough to make up for the real increase
in transport time that has taken place during the past years. In reality, the buyers are
able to choose between competing shipping lines with regard to price and punctuality,
but not transport time. Even in the case of punctuality, the companies maintain that
the discrepancy between the level of service they ideally would like to purchase and
what is offered is too large.
Several of the companies control their flow of goods in their physical network by
purchasing individual legs of the transport chain separately. This potentially creates
an opportunity to improve the lead time performance by optimising routing and
planning as well as some of the operations, but very little can be exerted from
these types of measures in the studied cases.
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The sourcing domain
Companies D and E utilise management of the sourcing domain as a means to handle
the increasing lead times that follow slow-steaming. Both companies’ inbound flows are
included in this case study. For Company E, where the flows regard components and
raw materials to manufacturing facilities that are primarily meant to serve a local mar-
ket, this entails not only choosing a supplier with regard to location, but also choosing
the type of components that would allow the mitigation of lead time effect by inventory
management. As elaborated above, the materials flow system and supply and distribu-
tion network of Company D is more diverse and complex; it is not able to be expressed
in such simplistic division. However, it was clear during the interviews and workshops
that sourcing domain management was one of two general strategies utilised for hand-
ling lead time increases.
Company D, which is a fashion retailer, already utilises the sourcing domain to man-
age seasonality and the different segments of their product range. Aside from the trans-
port domain in the medium to long term, choice of suppliers based on location is the
only viable solution because the company does not manufacture the products sold
under its own brand nor does it purchase its entire product range from sub-suppliers.
The two principle differences between the two companies that deliberately use the
sourcing domain strategy is that one (D) operates according to MTS and handles a flow
of finished products, and the other (E) purchases components and raw materials and
operates according to MTO. This means that where the former’s choices are limited to
supplier location, the latter can add an additional aspect of inventory management and
choice of components in its efforts. This is something that is already a feature of the
MTS system, but not of the MTO system if it is assumed that components are not kept
in stock.
The logistics and manufacturing domain
Both companies that utilise measures that can be categorised in the logistics and manu-
facturing domain handle outbound flows in an MTO setting. This makes one of the
most potent options of this domain irrelevant, i.e., producing to stock. Both companies
apply postponement and produce their products closer to their customers. By doing so,
the most time-consuming part of the transport chain is moved upstream, and the
stocks of inventory can be shifted from high-value finished products to components
and raw materials. The lead time gap is therefore expanded by keeping local stock of
the necessary input materials to satisfy the demands of the markets closer to the
facilities.
There are two different problems with this approach for the different companies.
Company B, though a leader in its segment, has a growth-by-acquisition strategy. This
has historically meant that the capability overlap between its facilities at different loca-
tions is not large enough for this strategy to be enough on its own in the short-to-
medium term. Many of the products can only be produced at a certain facility, and in
some cases, the overlap that exists is not properly spatially dispersed. This is likely due
to the fact that the primary reason for acquisition has not been to reduce lead time, but
to gain market shares and/or capabilities in other segments rather than existing ones.
For Company C, the problem is the market perception of the different facilities. Al-
though there is a certain disparity in quality between the more established facilities and
the newer offshore ones, the market perception of these differences are
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disproportionate, resulting in order specifications in regard to where the ordered prod-
ucts are to be produced. If this issue can be satisfactorily resolved, this approach could
prove to be very effective for reducing lead times.
The product design domain
Only Company C has utilised changes in the product design domain, to an extent of
any consequence, as a measure for reducing lead time. The design of the final product
has been modified so that a wide range of different products can be assembled locally
based on a handful of generic components, hence fostering postponement. This change
in design allows the company to expand the lead time gap by producing and shipping
components to different markets ahead of actual orders, which reduces customer lead
time. During the workshop, the other companies present could not identify a product
range in their market offering that could feasibly be redesigned in such a manner.
The strategies and combinations of strategies that the case companies currently use,
or see as likely to employ in the foreseeable future, are summarised in Table 2.
Concluding remarks
Slow-steaming, i.e., the practice of reducing sailing speed, is periodically adopted by
trans-ocean liner shipping companies. During periods where the market is charac-
terised by low demand, high fuel prices, low freight rates and over-capacity, they tend
to unilaterally reduce the speed of the service they offer. The latest instance in which
this has occurred is in the period following the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and
the speeds have not yet rebounded to pre-crisis levels. Most of the existing research re-
garding slow-steaming is from the fields of maritime engineering and maritime eco-
nomics, meaning that the phenomenon is studied from the ship owners’ perspectives in
the technical, operational and economics domains.
The shippers, i.e., the buyers of the maritime services, have garnered very little
attention from the research community, even though their systems bear the grunt
of the consequences of drastically shifting the properties of the services available.
In this exploratory case study, the answers to the questions of how the shippers’
systems are affected by the widespread application of slow-steaming and how shippers
manage these consequences are sought. To do so, a multiple case study consisting of six
Swedish multi-national companies has been undertaken. The case study is based on data
collected from interviews, seminars and workshops, secondary data, and literature
reviews.
The case companies use a number of strategies in order to manage the increase in
transport time. All try to reduce the lead time, or at least increase its punctuality, by
monitoring transport service suppliers and regularly re-evaluating them by open
Table 2 Summary of case company strategies for managing increasing transit lead time
Case company Transfer-the-problem Transport Sourcing Logistics and manufacturing Product design
A X X
B X X




Finnsgård et al. Journal of Shipping and Trade  (2018) 3:8 Page 19 of 24
competitive tenders. However, the lack of segmentation in the market offering from the
service providers was identified as a major obstacle for the efficacy of this strategy. Even
companies that are willing to pay substantially more for a higher quality liner shipping
service are basically faced by a mode choice and then between modes at either end of
the transport time and price scales, rather than a choice between shipping lines or
forwarders.
Two of the companies also approach this challenge by transfer-the-problem up-
or downstream. This means, in the case of the inbound flows of an MTS company,
that the suppliers are tasked with minimising their delivery times; in the case of an
MTO company’s outbound flow, the customer needs to accept the longer lead
times. The inbound flow of two other companies, one operating according to MTS
and the other to MTO, approach this issue in the sourcing domain. By selecting
suppliers that are geographically closer or sourcing generic components so as to
expand the lead time gap, they try to mitigate the impact of slower sailing speeds
on the lead time. The outbound flow of two other companies, both MTO, take on
this challenge in the logistics and manufacturing domain. This is achieved largely
by locating production facilities closer to the markets they supply in order to re-
duce the lead time to their customers. Finally, one of the companies also aims to
reduce lead time by redesigning their product range so as to be able to assemble a
large range of products from a handful of generic components. This enables the
company, which delivers its products according to MTO, to expand the lead time
gap by stocking production facilities closer to markets with generic components
based on sales forecasts. As a final note, this paper aimed at contributing in the
field of supply chain management and logistics rather than economics.
Appendix
Interview guide
Questionnaire Slow-Steaming Logistics – <Company > <date>
The purpose of this study is to explore how the shippers’ manage consequences of
slow-steaming maritime transport services in their supply chains. The interview will
start with a very short recap of the project, the project partners, financial backers and
the purpose of the project. The interview guide and questions will be in English;
however, the questions and answers will be in Swedish. The researchers performing
the interview will shortly present themselves.
Time, date and place:
Interviewers: <Interviewer1> (<Company>), <Interviewer2> (<Company>)
Q1: Could you introduce us with a brief presentation of yourselves and your roles in
your organization?
Q2: Confidentiality. We have to discuss the issue of confidentiality. This is a scientific
project with the aim to publish the results in a scientific journal. This area, slow-
steaming, is by research standards a relatively new phenomenon; how companies address
this phenomenon is even more so. We would like to be open with the case companies
that we are interviewing in this study. We have no special agenda to reveal secrets about
our interviewees in our publications—we are only trying to address our purpose.
Q3: Describe your company and business area.
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Q4: Local or global? Size (turnover/employees)? Growing/decreasing? Market share?
Q5: What type of flow of goods does your company have? Current state–history?
Q6: Do you use trans-ocean shipping?
Q7: What do you ship in or out? Current state–history?
Q8: Do you supply your processes or distribute out to customers or processes?
(different segments?)
Q9: MTS or MTO?
Q10: Customer order point?
Q11: Import/export?
Q12: What delivery terms do you use (or accept)? EXW, DDP, DDA, DDU
Q13: How far ahead do you need to secure (book) trans-ocean shipping?
Q14: Do you overbook trans-ocean shipping? (to be certain of capacity)
Q15: Do you have scheduled (fixed) bookings for trans-ocean shipping? (long-term or
short-term deals)
Q16: Do you speculate (spot-trade) in trans-ocean shipping?
Q17: What are your terms for cancelling trans-ocean shipping?
Q18: What happens with cancelled departures or if your cargo missed the departure?
Q19: How do you define lead time?
Q20: How do you define through-put time?
Q21: Have changes in either lead time or through-put time affected manufacturing
planning and control/inventory management/purchasing/distribution?
Q22: Have changes in either lead time or through-put time affected purchasing?
Q23: Have you noticed the phenomenon “slow-steaming”? If so, how?
Q24: When did this happen (that you noticed slow-steaming)? Was there a specific
moment in time?
Q25: How did you notice it?
Q26: Why did you notice it?
Q27: Did you (or could you have) affect(ed) the change? Did you want/need/prefer
to?
Q28: Can you now affect the speed of your trans-ocean shipping?
Q29: Would you be willing to pay additionally for a decreased sailing time for trans-
ocean shipping?
Q30: Would you consider it favorable to choose the sailing speed for trans-ocean
shipping?
Q31, How do you choose service providers? How do you purchase these services?
(A2B/system).
Q32: Have you modified your supply-distribution-storage-structure in any way (ac-
cording to slow-steaming)?
Q33: Have modifications of your supply chains been different in the long or short term?
Q34: Has slow-steaming affected your offering to the market? (services, delivery pre-
cision, etc.)
Q35: Increased costs due to slow-steaming. Have you noticed an increase in your
supply chain costs that you can refer to slow-steaming in trans-ocean shipping? If so,
how could you determine this, and have you followed it closely?
Q36: Are there trade-offs for your company regarding lead time, frequency, punctual-
ity, transport cost and total cost? Comment on each.
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Q37: What requirements do you have on your supply chains (trans-ocean shipping in
particular)?
Q38: How did you end up with these requirements? How did they evolve? (aware,
happened, are no, etc.)
Q39: Who controls the requirements? How are production, logistics and purchasing
connected in this aspect?
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